Reliability And Security Of Arbiter Based Physical Unclonable Function by Tariguliyev, Zaur
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ĐSTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY  INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
M.Sc. Thesis by 
Zaur TARIGULIYEV 
Department : Electronics and Communication Engineering 
Programme : Electronics Engineering 
JANUARY 2011  
RELIABILITY AND SECURITY OF  
ARBITER BASED PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTION 
  
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Supervisor (Chairman) : Assis. Prof. Dr. Siddika Berna ORS YALCĐN (ITU) 
 Members of the Examining Committee : Prof. Dr. Ece Olcay GUNES (ITU) 
 Assis. Prof. Dr. Gökay SALDAMLI (BU) 
  
  
 
ĐSTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY  INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
M.Sc. Thesis by 
Zaur TARIGULIYEV 
504021229 
 Date of submission : 20 December 2010 
 Date of defence examination : 25 January 2011 
 
RELIABILITY AND SECURITY OF  
ARBITER BASED PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTION 
 
JANUARY 2011 
   
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 OCAK 2011 
ĐSTANBUL TEKNĐK ÜNĐVERSĐTESĐ  FEN BĐLĐMLERĐ ENSTĐTÜSÜ 
YÜKSEK LĐSANS TEZĐ 
Zaur TARIGULIYEV 
504021229 
Tezin Enstitüye Verildiği Tarih : 20 Aralık 2010 
Tezin Savunulduğu Tarih : 25 Ocak 2011 
 
Tez Danışmanı : Yrd. Doç. Dr. Sıddıka Berna ÖRS YALÇIN (ĐTÜ) 
Diğer Jüri Üyeleri : Prof. Dr. Ece Olcay GÜNEŞ (ĐTÜ) 
 Yrd. Doç. Dr. Gökay SALDAMLI (BÜ) 
 
 
FLĐP-FLOP TABANLI FĐZĐKSEL KOPYALANAMAZ FONKSĐYONUN  
GÜVENLĐĞĐ VE GÜVENĐRLĐĞĐ 
 
  
  
v 
 
 
FOREWORD 
I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Berna ÖRS, for her 
inspiring advice and encouragment through the beginning to the end of this search. I 
would like to express my appreciation and thanks to Zafer Işcan, my best friend, for 
giving me the PR software tool, and help with translation from english to turkish. 
Furthemore, I’m thankful to my friends from Embedded System laboratory for 
technical support in experiments with the FPGA.  
 
December 2010 Zaur TARIGULIYEV  
Electronics Engineer  
 
 
  
vi 
 
 
  
vii 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
                                                                                                                                                       Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................... vii 
ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................ xi 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................ xiii 
SUMMARY ........................................................................................................... xv 
ÖZET ................................................................................................................. xvii 
1. INTRODUCTON ................................................................................................1 
2. DEFINITION AND APPLICATION OF PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE 
FUNCTIONS .......................................................................................................5 
2.1 Definition of One–Way Function .................................................................. 5 
2.2 Definition of a Physical Unclonable Function ............................................... 6 
2.3 PUF Based RFID Authentication .................................................................. 7 
3. DESCRIPTION AND LINEER MODEL OF PUF CIRCUIT ..........................9 
3.1 General Description ...................................................................................... 9 
3.2 Components of PUF Circuit........................................................................ 10 
3.3 Delay Paths in the PUF Circuit ................................................................... 12 
3.3.1 Switch delay ........................................................................................... 12 
3.3.2 Delay path configurations ....................................................................... 13 
3.4 Symmetrical Structure of PUF circuit ......................................................... 15 
3.5 Lineer Model of an Arbiter-based PUF ....................................................... 17 
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF A PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTION ON 
THE FPGA ........................................................................................................ 21 
4.1 Introduction to an FPGA ............................................................................ 21 
4.2 Implementation of PUF components ........................................................... 22 
4.2.1 Switch implemented with MUX .............................................................. 22 
4.2.2 The Arbiter ............................................................................................. 25 
4.3 Placement of Switch Box ............................................................................ 26 
5. ANALYSIS AND CHARACTERIZATION OF ARBITER-BASED PUF ..... 29 
5.1 Inter-chip Variation .................................................................................... 29 
5.1.1 Information –bearing challenges ............................................................. 29 
5.2 Environmental Variations ........................................................................... 32 
5.3 Identification/Authentication Abilites ......................................................... 33 
6. SOFTWARE ATTACKS ON ARBITER-BASED PHYSICAL 
UNCLONABLE FUNCTION ........................................................................... 37 
6.1 Prediction Tools ......................................................................................... 38 
6.1.1 Lineer Programming technique ............................................................... 38 
6.1.2 Lineer Support Vector Machine .............................................................. 40 
6.1.3 Radial Base Functions Support Vector Machine ...................................... 41 
6.2 Attacks on PUF Circuit Using Linear Programming Aproach ..................... 43 
6.2.1 Experiments with the lineer model of PUF circuit ................................... 43 
6.2.2 Experiments with the PUF on the FPGA ................................................. 44 
viii 
 
6.3 Attacks on PUF Circuit Using Support Vector Machine Classifiers ............. 46 
6.3.1 Experiment with the lineer model of the PUF circuit ............................... 46 
6.3.2 Experiments with the PUF on the FPGA ................................................. 47 
6.4 The Reason of Differences in Responses between the Lineer Model of the 
PUF and the PUF on the FPGA ................................................................... 49 
7. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 53 
APPENDICES ...................................................................................................... 59 
CURRICULUM VITAE .................................................................................... 611 
 
  
ix 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
POWF : Physical One Way Function 
PUF  : Physical Unclonable Function 
MUX  : Multiplexer 
SVM  : Support Vector Machine 
FPGA : Field Programmable Gate Array 
LUT  : Lookup Table 
RBF  : Radial Basis Function 
 
  
x 
 
  
xi 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
                                                                                                                                                              Page 
Table 5.1: Table of responses for different PUF circuits against challenges………28 
 
  
xii 
 
  
xiii 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
   Page  
Figure 2.1 : PUF based RFID authentication procedure .............................................8 
Figure 3.1 : Arbiter-based PUF circuit ......................................................................9 
Figure 3.2 : Operation of MUX blocks or switch block components ........................ 10 
Figure 3.3 : Operation of a D-type Flip-Flop and an Arbiter .................................... 11 
Figure 3.4 : Setup and Hold times in a Flip-Flop ..................................................... 11 
Figure 3.5 : Cell and connect delays in a PUF circuit .............................................. 12 
Figure 3.6 : Delays in a switch block ....................................................................... 13 
Figure 3.7 : Configured delay paths with C1=0 and C2=0 control inputs .................. 13 
Figure 3.8 : Configured delay paths with C1=0 and C2=1 control inputs .................. 14 
Figure 3.9 : Configured delay paths with C1=0 and C2=0 control inputs .................. 14 
Figure 3.10 : Configured delay paths with C1=1 and C2=1 control inputs ................ 14 
Figure 3.11 : Arbiter operation in the example with m1 and m2 path delays ............. 15 
Figure 3.12 : More general structure of arbiter based PUF ...................................... 15 
Figure 3.13 : The symmetrical wiring between two switch blocks ........................... 16 
Figure 3.14 : PUF circuits represented with switch blocks and switch delays .......... 17 
Figure 4.1 : A Switch block implemented with a MUX ........................................... 22 
Figure 4.2 : RTL schematic of a switch implemented with a MUX ......................... 23 
Figure 4.3 : Access the “Property” option of a synthesize process ........................... 24 
Figure 4.4 : Setting “Keep Hierarchy” parameter to “YES” value ........................... 24 
Figure 4.5 : The D type edge-triggered flip flop ...................................................... 25 
Figure 4.6 : The VHDL code synthesizing a NAND gate ........................................ 26 
Figure 4.7 : The placement of MUX switches in Floorplanner................................. 27 
Figure 4.7 : Constraints in “UCF” file to select LUT F and LUT G for placement of 
MUXs .................................................................................................. 27 
Figure 5.1 : The density function of the random variable pi=Pr(Ri,j(Ci)=1) .............. 30 
Figure 5.2 : The density of the inter-chip variation yi,j for a number of .................... 32 
Figure 5.3 : The variation of PUF responses due to temperature and power ............. 33 
Figure 6.1 : Example of solving linear programming problem ................................. 39 
Figure 6.2 : Maximum- margin hyperplane separating classes ................................. 41 
Figure 6.3 : Mapping process for a nonlinear separating surface .............................. 42 
Figure 6.4 : The graph of error rates in prediction of responses by Lineer ............... 44 
Figure 6.5 : The graph of error rates in prediction of responses by Lineer ............... 45 
Figure 6.6 : The graph of error rates in prediction of responses by Lineer SVM for 
the lineer model of the PUF .................................................................. 46 
Figure 6.7 : The graph of error rates in prediction of responses by RBF SVM ......... 47 
xiv 
 
Figure 6.8 : The graph of error rates in prediction of responses by Lineer SVM ...... 48 
Figure 6.9 : The graph of error rates in prediction of responses by RBF SVM ......... 48 
Figure 6.10 : The last stage of thePUF circuit with the cell and ............................... 49 
Figure 6.11 : Statistical model of delay capturing process variations ....................... 50 
Figure 6.12 : Static delays for last stage of PUF circuit ........................................... 51 
Figure 6.13 : Cumulative delay for last stage of PUF with cross connected switch 
block .................................................................................................. 52 
Figure 6.14 : Cumulative delay for last stage of PUF with direct connected switch 
block .................................................................................................. 52 
 
Figure A. 1:Two successive MUX blocks with delay variables ............................... 60 
  
  
xv 
 
 
RELIABILITY AND SECURITY OF ARBITER BASED PHYSICAL 
UNCLONABLE FUNCTION 
SUMMARY 
Modern cryptographic protocols are based on the principle that only authorized 
people can obtain secret keys and access to information systems. However, various 
kinds of tampering methods have been devised to extract secret information from 
smartcards, ATMs and other low-cost electronic devices. In order to resist to cloning 
and physical attacks physical unclonable functions (PUFs) based on random 
variations in physical properties of materials were proposed. Using these variations 
we can obtain unique secret keys. As a result , we no longer need to store the secret 
keys in digital form. Firstly, this idea was realized using optical micro-structure with 
bubbles. Then, silicon material was used to realize the Arbiter-based Physical 
Unclonable Functions (PUFs). This technique exploits statistical delay variation of 
logic gates across integrated circuits (ICs) due to manufacturing processes to build a 
secret key unique to each IC. PUF circuits generate a lot of unique, unpredictable, 
though reliable secret keys from each chip. They are dynamically generated, using a 
challenge response pairs (CRPs) scheme.  
We implemented Arbiter-based PUFs in Xilinx Virtex 2 Pro FPGA and investigated 
the identification capability, reliability, and security of this scheme. Experimental 
results show that the internal interconnection in the FPGA leads to asymetric 
structure of the PUF circuit which reduces the effect of variations in random 
component of delays on the responses from PUF circuits. This case lowers the 
Hamming distance between the responses which directly effects the inter-chip 
parameter. Environmental noise and inter-chip variation are very important 
characteristics for the identification process between different PUF circuits. The 
sources of environmental noise are temperature and voltage variations.  The practical 
range of variations due to the environmental noise shows reliability of the secret keys 
produced by PUFs on the FPGA. Two different approaches are applied in order to 
test the resistance of the PUF circuit against software attacks. In the first approach, 
attacks are considered as a classification problem. Using definite numbers of known 
CRPs, the classifiers are trying to predict the responses for new challenges. In this 
thesis, Lineer SVM and radial basis function (RBF) SVM classifiers are used. In the 
second approach, using definite numbers of known CRPs and lineer model of PUF 
circuit, Lineer Programming technique is trying to find delay variables. 
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FLIP-FLOP TABANLI FIZIKSEL KOPYALANAMAZ FONKSIYONUN 
GÜVENLĐĞĐ VE GÜVENĐRLĐĞĐ 
ÖZET 
Modern kriptografik protokoller, sadece yetkili kişilerin gizli anahtar elde edip, 
sistemdeki bilgiye ulaşabilmesi temeline dayanır. Ancak, akıllı kartlardan, 
ATM’lerden ve diğer ucuz maliyetli elektronik sistemlerden gizli bilgiyi elde etmek 
için, çeşitli fiziksel müdahale yöntemleri tasarlanmıştır. Klonlamaya ve fiziksel 
saldırılara karşı koymak için, malzemelerin fiziksel özelliklerindeki rastgele 
değişimlere dayanan fiziksel kopyalanamaz fonksiyonlar önerilmiştir. Bu değişimleri 
kullanarak birbirinden farklı gizli anahtarlar elde edebiliriz. Sonuç olarak, gizli 
anahtarları sayısal şekilde saklamaya artık ihtiyacımız olmayacaktır. Ilk olarak bu 
fikir içinde kabarcık olan optik mikro yapı kullanarak gerçeklenmiştir, sonrasında 
flip-flop tabanlı PUF gerçekleştirmek için silikon maddesi kullanılmıştır. Bu yöntem 
her entegre devreye özgü bir gizli anahtar oluşturmak için, entegre devrelerin üretim 
süreçlerinden kaynaklanan lojik kapıların istatistiksel gecikme değişimleri 
kullanılmaktadır. PUF devresi her bir yonga için çok sayıda birbirinden farklı, 
tahmin edilemeyen ve güvenilir gizli anahtar üretir. Bu anahtarlar dinamik ileti cevap 
çifti yöntemi ile oluşturulmaktadırlar. 
 Bu tezde flip-flop tabanlı PUF devresi Xilinx Virtex 2 Pro FPGA’de gerçeklenmiştir 
ve bu yöntemin kimlik belirleme yeteneği, güvenirliği ve güvenliği incelenmiştir. 
Deneysel sonuçlar, FPGA içindeki ara bağlantıların, PUF devresini simetrik olmayan 
yapıya getirdiğini ve gecikme değişiminin rastgele bileşeninin PUF devrelerinden 
alınan cevaplara etkisini azalttığını göstermektedir. FPGA’ler arası değişimi 
doğrudan etkileyen bu durum, farklı FPGA üzerindeki PUF devrelerin ürettiği 
cevaplar arasındaki Hamming mesafesini azaltır. Çevresel gürültü ve FPGA’ler arası 
değişim, farklı PUF devreleri arasındaki tanımlama süreci için çok önemli 
özelliklerdir. Çevresel gürültüden kaynaklanan değişimler pratikteki aralığı, FPGA 
üzerindeki PUF’lar tarafından üretilen gizli anahtarların güvenirliğini 
göstermektedir. Bu tezde PUF devresinin yazılımsal saldırılara karşı direncini 
ölçmek için iki farklı yaklaşım uygulanmıştır. Đlk yaklaşımda, saldırılar bir sınıflama 
problemi olarak ele alınmıştır. Sınıflayıcılar, belirli sayıdaki bilinen ileti cevap 
çiftlerini (CRPs) kullanarak, yeni girişlere karşı oluşacak cevapları tahmin etmeye 
çalışmaktadırlar. Đkinci yaklaşımda Lineer Programlama tekniği, belirli sayıdaki 
bilinen ileti cevap çiftlerini ve PUF devresinin lineer modelini kullanarak, gecikme 
değişkenlerini bulmaya çalışmaktadır. 
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1. INTRODUCTON 
Typically, cryptography is used to secure communication between two parties 
connected by an untrusted network [1]. In such communication, each party has 
privately stored key information which allows it to encrypt, decrypt, and authenticate 
the communication. It is implicitly assumed that each party is capable of securing its 
private information. This assumption is reasonable when a party is a military 
installation, or even a person, but breaks down completely for low-cost consumer 
devices. Once a secret key is attained, eavesdropping and impersonation attacks 
become possible [2]. 
In low cost devices such as RFIDs and smartcards is essential that sensitive 
information is safely stored and communicated. However, the inherent power and 
footprint limitations of such devices, prevent us from employing standard 
cryptographic techniques for authentication which were originally designed to secure 
high end systems with abundant power. In practice, the implementation cost of 
cryptographic hash functions is near that of block ciphers which is around 10K logic 
gates [3, 4]. For RFIDs the footprint allotted for security is less than 1K gates [5]. 
Public-key cryptography bears significant computational overhead when compared to 
secret key techniques. Furthermore, even if the footprint problem is solved, each time 
an authentication takes place, the device has to transmit large amounts of data 
through the channel to the reader, which will unnecessarily consume the power of the 
device.  
Another issue of secret key technique is resilience against invasive and non-invasive 
physical tampering attacks. Laser cutting, microprobing and power analysis have 
made it possible to extract digitalized secret information from ICs and compromise 
conditional access systems by using illegal copies of the secret information [2]. 
Focusing on the problem of invasive attacks, it is apparent that once a device has 
been opened, the large difference in state between a 0 and a 1 makes it relatively easy 
to read out the device’s digitally stored secrets. Traditionally, such attacks are 
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avoided by detecting intrusion and erasing the key memory when an intrusion is 
detected [6]. However, tamper-sensing environments are expensive to produce and, 
as long as a key is being protected, the intrusion sensors need to be powered, further 
increasing costs. In order to resist to the cloning and invasive attacks random 
functions based on the randomness in physical materials were proposed. 
Chronology in development of unclonable artifacts shows that the first powerful 
notion of a physical one-way function (POWF) was introduced by Papu et. al [7].  In 
the study of the physical one way functions he used transparent optical medium with 
a 3–dimensional micro-structure containing bubbles. The input-challenge of the 
POWF is an incomming laser beam and the output (response) is a fixed-length bit 
vector derived from resulting interference patterns. The interference pattern depends 
on the angle and frequency of incoming beam and the speckle pattern in the optical 
medium. After that, Gassend et. al. introduced the concept of a silicon physical 
unclonable function or silicon PUF [8, 9]. Modern and future silicon technology-
based integrated circuits may serve as PUFs due to their intrinsic manufacturing 
variability. Essentially, a number of unavoidable physical and chemical phenomena, 
such as silicon lattice imperfection, uneven distribution of dopants, imperfect mask 
alignment, and non-uniform chemical mechanical polishing, result in gates with 
sharply different characteristics.  Already in 45 nanometer technology, it is common 
that the delay of the same gate in different ICs differs by 1/3 from the nominal value 
[7]. Therefore two silicon PUFs, having the same structure and designed to be 
sensitive to circuit delays, implemented on the same IC or different ICs have 
different responses to the same inputs. 
 Since process variation is beyond manufacturers' control, even an adversary who has 
detailed information of the PUF circuit cannot physically clone the silicon PUF of a 
given IC.  So the authentication in PUF circuits is based on hidden delay or timing 
information corresponding to a circuit rather than digitial information [10]. Since 
there are several types of PUFs with different structure and complexities from a 
security point of view (XOR PUF, Feed Forward PUF, and Ring Oscilator PUF) we 
consider only basic type called arbiter-based PUF.  
The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate the reliability and resistance of a 
PUF, implemented on FPGA, to software attacks.  Also, we aim to implement PUF 
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structures based on MUXs and make analysis on data obtained from them. These 
data enable us to study the characteristics of the PUFs and sensitivity to changes to 
environmental factor such as the ambient temperature and voltage variations 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 defines physical unclonable functions 
and physical one-way functions, gives an example of one-way mathematical 
function. Furthemore, in this chapter one of the most common application of PUF is 
considered. 
 In Chapter 3 general overview of PUF system and notion of the delays is considered. 
In this we cover the fundamental components containing in the differential structure 
of PUF. Also, we show how delay path can be configured using additive property of 
the delay and underline the conditions that are providing more sensitivity to inherit 
process variation in PUF circuits. We provide a linear model of PUF circuit where 
responses are expressed in terms of challenges and delay variables. 
Chapter 4 introduces a detailed circuit implementation of arbiter-based PUF on a 
Xilinx FPGA device using program Xilinx ISE 9.2. We shortly touches on the 
primitive logic elements that enable us to implement the main components of PUF 
circuit. Furthemore, the hardware description language codes(VHDL) that generate 
these components are also given. In this chapter we show how to adjust “synthesize” 
tool that comes inside Xilinx ISE 9.2 in order to prevent from converting MUX. Also 
with the integrated in ISE environment “Floorplanner” tool we try to achieve 
symmetrical placement of switch blocks. 
In Chapter 5 the experimental results for PUFs implemented on FPGA are shown. 
We analyze the important, for security and reliability, characteristics of PUFs such as 
the inter-chip variation and environmental noise. 
Chapter 6 studies the vulnerability of the arbiter-based PUFs against possible 
software attack models. Based on the linear model we make attacks using a limited 
number of linear inequalities and linear programming technique. Using this method, 
we try to solve for uknown delay parameters of the circuit. Then we compare the 
responses produced by our theoric model and the model extracted by linear 
programming algorithm. In the second attack we use artificial neural network.  
Providing challenge-response pairs for training of the Supported Vector Machine 
neural networks, the prediction capabilites of these methods are investigated. Also, in 
this chapter is told about causes of inconsistency between responses of a lineer model 
of a PUF with the responses obtained from FPGA.  
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Finally, in the last chapter all the parameters that have effects on security of PUF on 
FPGA are summarized.  
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2. DEFINITION AND APPLICATION OF PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE 
FUNCTIONS 
2.1 Definition of One–Way Function  
Information security requires a mechanism that provides significant asymmetry in 
the effort required to make intended and unintended uses of encoded information. 
Modern cryptographic practice rest on the use of one-way functions(OWF). If   is 
one–way function i.e for any argument it is easy to compute but extremely hard to 
invert, then, even if  and   were made public, it would be nearly impossible 
for a reasonable adversary to compute the password (PW)  from  . Here, a 
reasonable adversary is one that does not have access to exponential computing 
resources.  
Here is the formal definition of one-way functions. 
A function f:{0,1}*{0,1}* is called strongly one-way if the following two 
conditions hold[2]. 
• Easy to compute: There exist a deterministic polynomial time algorithm A 
such that on input x, A outputs   
• Hard to invert: For every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm ’, every 
polynomial 	, and all sufficiently large 
  
 
 ′                                                                           (2.1) 
Saying that a function  is easy to compute means that there exist a P-time algorithm 
 which, given an input  , output . The second condition means that the 
probability that algorithm ’ will find an inverse of  under  is negligible[1]. Weak 
one-way functions require only that all efficient algorithms fail with some non-
negligible probability.  
In order to give an example of OWF candidate let’s define a function as 	,  
	   , where 	 and  are -bit primes and   is the regular integer multiplication[2]. 
(So , our domain is the set of pairs of k-bit primes, and :     " where  is 
the set of -bit primes, and " is set of 2  -bit numbers ). So clearly,  is not a 
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permutation. And let’s assume that n=p q, so that 	,   	    
 . There’s no 
known polynomial time algorithm  such that 
 output values 	’ and ’ so 
$%&$ 	’  ’  
.  Of course, we can object this claim offering test all the number 
from 2 to √
 . And propose a program that works like the following: 
For i=2 to √
 do  
If (i divides n ) then output (i,() ); 
And we would claim that our program runs in time O(√
 which is polynomial in 
temrs of n [2]. However, keep in mind taht the number n inputted in this algorithm is 
of magnitude roughly  2*+ and of size 2k and since √
 , √2*+ ,   2+ , this 
algorithm runs in time O( 2+ , which is exponential in terms of input size. Thus this 
algorithm runs in exponential time. And, no algorithm that’s polynomial in terms of 
k is known that can factor n. Therefore, this function f is easy to compute and 
difficult to invert . 
2.2 Definition of a Physical Unclonable Function 
 Instead of using computational complexity of algorithm, we can exploit the physical 
randomness in nature, such as heterogeneous optical medium, electrical noise, and 
process variation in silicon manufacturing, to construct unclonable functions[2]. A 
physical unclonable function has common properties as one way function but 
differently it’s implemented in a physical device.   
Here is a definition of physical unclonable functions based on the definition of one-
way functions. The term challenge refers to the input to the functions and response 
refers to the output [1]. 
A physical Random Function is the function embodied by a physical device, and 
maps challenges to responses. A physical unclonable function satisfies the following 
properties: 
• Easy to evaluate: The physical device can easily evaluate the function in a 
short period. 
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• Hard to predict: From a polynomial number of physical measurements (in 
particular, determination of chosen challenge – response pairs(CRPs) ), an 
adversary who no longer has the device and can only use a polynomial 
amount of resources (time, matter) can extract only a negligible amount of 
information about the response to a randomly chosen challenge. 
By the tern “easy”, we mean that the function can be computed in polynomial 
time. 
2.3 PUF Based RFID Authentication 
PUFs are tiny electrical circuit primitives that exploit the unavoidable IC fabrication 
process variations to generate unlimited number of unique, unpredictable, though 
reliable "secrets" from each chip. These secrets are dynamically generated, using a 
challenge response scheme. A PUF is queried with a challenge vector (input vector) - 
a random 64-bit (or longer) number. It almost instantly generates a unique response 
vector (output) - a 64-bit (or longer) number. 
In the figure 2.1, an application of PUF based RFID authentication is given [15]. As 
shown in the figure below, a set of challenge response pairs are collected from the 
chip, and stored in a database. This may usually happen at an initial stage in the life 
of the chip, perhaps at a secure location. To authenticate the chip at a later time, one 
of the stored challenges from the database is sent to the chip, the response generated 
is compared against the one initially recorded in the database. If the two match, the 
chip is authentic. Since each chip can have multiple challenge response pairs, each 
challenge response pair is used just once, as a one-time pad. This prevents replay 
attacks on PUF authentication.  
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Figure 2.1 : PUF based RFID authentication procedure 
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3.  DESCRIPTION AND LINEER MODEL OF PUF CIRCUIT 
3.1  General Description 
An arbiter-based PUF is a {0, 1}n →{0, 1} mapping, that takes a n-bit challenge (a) 
and produces a single bit output (r). The basic idea of a PUF circuit is to create a race 
between two signals which originate challenge (C) as an input and produces a single 
bit output (R). The arbiter based PUF circuit consists of n consecutive MUX blocks. 
Each MUX block consist of two MUXs and has two input and two output bits and a 
control or select bit. If the control bit of a MUX block is logical 0, the two inputs are 
directly passed to the outputs through a straight path. However, if the control bit is 
set to logical 1, the two input signals are switched before being passed to the outputs 
of the MUX block. Based on the control bit of the MUX block, each of the two input 
signals will take one of two possible paths. As can be seen from Figure 3.1, there are 
n MUX blocks where the output of each block is connected to the input of the 
following block. After the last block, the two output signals are connected to an D 
Flip-flop. The two inputs of the first block are connected to each other, and the 
connection is sourced by a pulse generator. 
 
Figure 3.1 : Arbiter-based PUF circuit 
Afterwards, a pulse is generated and fed into the inputs of the first block. Since the 
inputs of the first block are connected, the pulses traveling through each of the two 
paths(red and blue lines) are expected to be simultaneous. Although these two paths 
have been supposed to be perfectly symmetrical, manufacturing variations of these 
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paths will cause a small mismatch. As the two pulses pass through the consecutive 
MUXs, they will start acquiring a time delay. The arbiter at the end of the delay 
paths determines which rising edge arrives first and sets its output to 0 or 1 
depending on  which of the pulses comming first .  
3.2  Components of PUF Circuit 
As it’s seen in the Figure3.1 the main components of PUF circuit are MUX blocks 
and D-type Flip Flop. Due to their functions they can be representated as a switch 
block and an arbiter. In the next chapters MUX blocks and switch blocks are used 
interchangeably. The same is valid for a D-type Flip- flop and an arbiter component.  
So, switches as MUX block have 2 inputs, 2 outputs and control or select pins. 
Applying logic “0” to control pin provide direct connection between input and output 
which means the signal stay on the same path. On the contrary, if control signal is 
logic “1” the connection are cross coupled which means the input signals interchange 
their path.  The described operation of switch block component is shown in the 
Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2 : Operation of MUX blocks or switch block components 
A positive edge-triggered D-type flip-flop or arbiter has two input and 1 output pins 
as it shown in the Figure 3.3. On the positive transition of the clock, the Q outputs 
will be set to the logic states that were set up at the D input. This logic states are hold 
until the next transition of clock input.  
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Figure 3.3 : Operation of a D-type Flip-Flop and an Arbiter 
Flip – flop have setup and hold time that must be satisfied [22]: 
 
Figure 3.4 : Setup and Hold times in a Flip-Flop 
If D will arrives before setup time and is stable after the hold time Flip-Flop will 
work. FF will slow the signal by the setup and “clk to Q” delay in the worst case. In a 
PUF circuit, if the delay difference between signals in G and D pins is more than 
setup time, Tsetup , the output will be logic ”1” ,otherwise the output will be logic ”0”.    
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3.3 Delay Paths in the PUF Circuit 
3.3.1 Switch delay 
CMOS non-linear model let us define the total(switch) delay of a logic gate i.e the 
delay between input of the first gate and the input of the next gate as shown in the 
Figure 3.5[23].  This model propose us to divide the switch delay in two components 
as cell delay and connect delay which is expressed below by the formula  (3.1) 
-./)012  -1344 5 -16((310  (3.1)       
The -1344  delay contributed by the MUX gate itself, is typically defined as the 50 
percent input pin voltage to 50 percent output voltage [26]. Cell delay is usually a 
function of both output loading and input transition time. The connect delay -16((310 
of an element is the time it takes the voltage at an input pin to charge after the 
driving output pin has made a transition. In brief, it’s the time neccesary for a 
waveform to travel along a wire. The connect delay are the function of wire 
capacitance, pin capacitance and wire resistance. The wire capacitance and wire 
resistance are related with wire length. 
 
Figure 3.5 : Cell and connect delays in a PUF circuit 
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3.3.2 Delay path configurations 
Unique delay paths consist of unique delay of MUXs. Diﬀerent challenges will 
impose diﬀerent paths on the propagating pulses. In order to see different 
configurations of delay path in PUF circuit we can consider  a circuit that consist of 
two switch components. In this example we assume that the delay behavior’s of 
circuit obeys additive delay model[10]. 
 
Figure 3.6 : Delays in a switch block 
We label the two paths which the upper signal can take as ai and bi, and for the lower 
signal as di and fi. Paths a1 and f1 are chosen when the challenge bit c1 is 0, whereas 
b1 and d1 are chosen when the challenge bit is 1. 
 
Figure 3.7 : Configured delay paths with C1=0 and C2=0 control inputs 
  
When C1 =0 1.path delay  is a1  
          2. path delay is f1 
When C1 =1 1.path delay  is d1  
          2. path delay is b1 
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Figure 3.8 : Configured delay paths with C1=0 and C2=1 control inputs 
 
Figure 3.9 : Configured delay paths with C1=0 and C2=0 control inputs 
 
Figure 3.10 : Configured delay paths with C1=1 and C2=1 control inputs 
&), ) is the delays of a signal gained at the end of direct passing through switch to 
the input of next switch and 7), 8) is the delays of a signal gained at the end of cross 
passing through switch to the input of the next switch . 
• For  1. path all set of total delay will be  
 
m1,1(b)= a1 + a2     (C1=0, C2=0)  (3.2)  
m1,2(b)= f1 + d2     (C1=0, C2=1) (3.3)  
m1,3(b)= b1 + d2    (C1=1, C2=1) (3.4)  
 m1,4(b)= b1 + f2     (C1=1, C2=0) (3.5)  
• For 2. path  all set of total delay will be 
m2,1(b)= f1 + f2     (C1=0, C2=0)  (3.6)                 
m2,2(b)= a1 + b2   (C1=0, C2=1)  (3.7)  
m2,3(b)= d1 + b2  (C1=1, C2=1)   (3.8) 
m2,4(b)= b1 + f2   (C1=1, C2=0)  (3.10) 
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If we set 9:  0 and  9:  1 , the delay of path 1 is =:,) f1 + d2 and  =*,) a1 + b2. 
So, if the delay difference, δ, between path 2 and path 1 is greater than Tsetup the 
response will be logic “1” , otherwise the response will be logic “0”as depicted in the 
Figure 3.10 . As we see for n=2 challenges we get 2x22  different  configurations or 
equations for 1 and 2 path.  So if we generalize n challenge bits lead to 2n  equations 
for each path with 4n unknow delay variables. 
 
Figure 3.11 : Arbiter operation in the example with m1 and m2 path delays 
3.4  Symmetrical Structure of PUF circuit 
Analyzing the PUF circuit, which is shown in the Figure 3.1, and path delays, which 
are described in previous section, allow us to propose more general structure of PUF 
as shown in the Figure 3.11, below: 
 
Figure 3.12 : More general structure of arbiter based PUF 
The delay pathes are configured by using n-bit challenge vectors.  These challenges 
select different routing for signals. The signal travelling on this route passing through 
different switches or MUXes. So, the total delay of signal1 and signal2 at the end of 
delay paths is sum expression where each entry belongs to unique combination of 
unique delays.   In order to find more general expression for the total delay path 1 
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and 2 we adds up all the switch delays that signal passing through. After that we 
separate all switch delays to cell and connect delays components. All this operation 
are reflected in the formula 3.9 and 3.10. The arbiter gives the output according to 
measured  differences between these delay paths. Formula 3.11 gives the general 
expression for these difference. 
-:=∑ -./)012: 9))?(4?:   ∑ -1344:)?()?: 9) 5 -16((310: 9)  (3.11)      
-*=∑ -./)012* 9))?(4?:   ∑ -1344*)?()?: 9) 5 -16((310* 9)                                       (3.12)    
@  -*--:=∑ -1344*)?()?: 9) A -1344: 9) 5  -16((310* 9) A -16((310: 9)) (3.13) 
The last expression show that if difference of connect delay components are much 
more than difference of cell delay component and setup time of D Flip-flop then the 
response of PUF circuit are biased to logic”1” or logic “0”. As a result the circuit 
become insensitive to process variations in silicon. That is why we need to reduce the 
contribution of a connect delay. From section 3.3.1 we know that connect delays are 
mainly the function of wire length. That’s why the only way to do it is to make the 
structure of PUF symmetric i.e make wire length connecting the MUXs equal. Figure 
3.12 help us to depict our statement 
 
Figure 3.13 : The symmetrical wiring between two switch blocks 
The symmetrical structure must be maintaned through all PUF circuit in order to 
produce random responses against random challenge vectors.   
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3.5  Lineer Model of an Arbiter-based PUF 
In this section we derive a linear model for arbiter based PUF [1].  
 
Figure 3.14 : PUF circuits represented with switch blocks and switch delays 
To compute the total delay, the path of the upper signal is followed from the initial 
input pulse. The signal will start traveling in a separate path to get to the first switch. 
Let us label this initial delay as a0. For the signal going through the lower path we 
label this delay as f0. In the first switch the delay of the signal 1 will be (BC1a1 + c1b1), 
where BC1 is the complement of c1. The delay in the second switch will depend on 
whether the signals switched paths in the first stage or not. For signal 1 if it doesn’t 
change path ( c1 =0) the delay at switch2 will be BC1(BC2a2 + c2b2). If it changes (c1 =1) 
the delay at switch will be c1(BC2f2 + c2d2) . So, the total delay of signal 1 at switch 2 
will be BC1(BC2a2 + c2b2) + c1(BC2f2 + c2d2) . Let’s specify a new variable xi which 
represents the parity of the first i−1 challenge bits, and will signify if the signal 
starting at the upper path stays in that path or moves to the lower path after i − 1 
switches. The expression for xi is  
)  B: D B* D … D B): (3.14)      
So the delay of i th switch can be denoted as C i(BCiai + cibi) +xi(BCifi + cidi) 
. The total delay in the pulse of signal 1 is  
-:  &F 5 ∑ C)()?: BC)&) 5  B)7) 5 )BC)) 5  B)8) (3.15)    
Similarly the delay for the signal 2 initiated in lower path can be derived to be equal 
to 
-*  F 5 ∑ C)()?: BC)) 5  B)8) 5  )BC)&) 5  B)7) (3.16)             
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The diﬀerence between these two delays δ is the main variable for our model. This 
diﬀerence will decide whether the output of the PUF is 0 or 1. Since we do not know 
which of the two signals will end up in the upper path, we will need to incorporate 
the parity of all the challenge bits which we label P. The diﬀerence between the two 
delays becomes 
@  A1G-: A -*  A1GHIJ A )
(
)?:
BIJ&) A ) 5  B)7) A  8) 5  
&F A F       (3.17)                  
@   HA1GKLM
(
)?:
BIJ&) A  ) 5  B)7) A  8) 5  
A1G&F A  F (3.18)                          
Finally , we define  N)  OMPQMRMPSM*  and  T)  OMQMRMSM*   for  
i=1...n and  NF  &F A F. We define the parity of the challenge bits from a reverse 
order as 	)  K)  B) D B)P: D … D B( . The delay equation becomes:  
@   ∑ A1UM()?: T) 5  A11MN) 5  A1GNF  A1UM  T) 5  A1UMD1MN) + 
 
A1GNF   (3.19)         
Since connection delays in direct and cross wiring between two following switch 
boxes ideally suppose to be equal, due to symmetry, we can conclude that the 
defined variable ui must be close to zero. Extracted expressions for ui  and N) variable 
are given in appendix A. So,  in the above expression for  @(delay difference) we can 
omit the parameter ui . Note that p1=P, and that 	)KB)  B)P: .  After defining yi=νi-1 
the final delay equation becomes  
 @  ∑ A1UM()?: ) 5  (P: (3.20)            
Equation (3.20) uses only n+1 rather than 2n+1 variables to desribe the delay 
between the upper and lower signal paths.  It’s important to note that the delay 
variation yi will depend on the fabrication process of the PUF circuit and they denote 
imbalance in signal propogation paths in V02 stage of the PUF . Therefore, one would 
expect these variable to follow a normal distribution. Without loss of generality, we 
can normalize these values and assume they belong to a normal distribution of mean 
0 and variance 1.  We invoke the arbiter condition for the response bit R. We have  
δ> Ts   R=1 (3.21)              
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δ< Ts  R=0 (3.22)         
Where Ts is the setup time for the arbiter.. Finally , we can use Equation to write 
response equation. 
A1W ∑ A1UM()?: ) 5 (P:  0  (3.23)     
Equation (3.21) is an inequality relating the challenge vector C which consist of n 
input bits Ci to the output bit R. This inequality has n+1  variables which characterize 
the  PUF circuit. So, for a single PUF, we may form the following linear equation: 
δ j =A1UXYy1 + … +  A1UZY* + ... + A1U[Y ( + (P:             (3.24) 
Using Equation 2 we may write the following linear inequalitiy 
A1WY[A1UXY     A1UZY . . . A1U[Y 1] Y < 0  (3.25)
  
where   Y=^: * … (P:] 
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4. IMPLEMENTATION OF A PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTION ON 
THE FPGA 
4.1 Introduction to an FPGA 
For implementation of PUF circuit we preferred FPGA Virtex2Pro designed and 
produced by Xilinx Corporation. FPGA devices are preffered to custom IC because 
of some advantages such as flexibility in reprogrammability and short amount of 
time for implementation of circuits [11].  
FPGAs contain programmable logic components called "configurable logic blocks", 
and a hierarchy of reconfigurable interconnects that allow the blocks to be "wired 
together", somewhat like a one-chip programmable breadboard. Logic blocks can be 
configured to perform complex combinational functions, or merely simple logic 
gates like AND and XOR. In most FPGAs, the logic blocks also include memory 
elements, which may be simple flip-flops or more complete blocks of memory [12].  
CLB resources include four slices and two 3-state buffers. Each slice is equivalent 
and contains:  
• Two function generators (F&G) 
• Two storage elements 
• Arithmetic logic gates 
• Large multiplexers 
• Fast carry look-ahead chain 
• Horizontal cascade chain (OR gates) 
The function generators F & G are configurable as 4-input look-up tables (LUTs), as 
16 bit shift registers, or as 16-bit distributed SelectRAM+ memory. In addition , the 
two storage elements are either edge-triggered D type flip flops or level-sensitive 
latches. Each CLB has fast internal interconnect and connects to a switch matrix to 
access general routing resources [12]. 
4.2 Implementation of PUF components
Xilinx ISE 9.2 is the one of  a software tool produced by
analysis of HDL designs, which enables the dev
perform timing analysis, examine
different stimulus, and configure the target device with the
synthesize a component and implement it on FPGA we should know the VHDL 
design flow and understand VHDL codes
in FPGA by using function generators or look
4.2.1 Switch implemented with MUX
The structure of this switch unit is shown on the Figure 
includes two MUX elements. So this structure enable us to connect  directly or cross 
connect inputs  “dI0” and “dI1”  to outputs “dQ0” a
challenge input bit  . 
 
Figure 4.1 : A Switch block implemented with a MUX
For synthesis of MUX switch we need to define the entity with three inputs (one of 
them is challenge bit) and two outputs. Inside of the entity we describe the MUX unit 
and how they connected. In the architecture part of VHDL codes we define t
statement “
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 Xilinx for synthesis and 
eloper to synthesize  their designs, 
 RTL diagrams, simulate a design's reaction to 
 programmer. In order to 
 [13] Any primitive logic are implemented 
-up tables(LUTs) [12]. 
 
4.1. Each switch 
nd “dQ1”   depending on a 
 
 
he loop 
” ,which is necessary to obtain  a chain of 
unit 
serially connected MUX switch
of input vector of challenge bits.
blocks on FPGA are given in 
synthesizing this code we get RTL schematic as shown on Figure 
A Synthesizer integrated in ISE tool always try to optimize the 
usually many ways to implement logic with a 
synthesis/mapping/place & route tools
timing requirement, these blocks may be optimized in terms of placement and 
logic design, possibly at the cost of an increased area
the result of synthesis the MUX gate are simplified and
not as shown in the figure 3.1.
synthesizer as it shown on the figures 
 
Figure 4.2 : RTL schematic of a switch implemen
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 [15] .  spesifies the number of switches and the size 
 The VHDL codes for implementation of switch 
the CD, which is attached with the thesis. As a result of 
4.2. 
logic. There
given functionality. If the 
 recognize that certain blocks do not fulfil a 
 or slow speed. That is
 the routing between gates are 
 To avoid it we must change the constraints of 
4.3, 4.4. 
ted with a MUX
 
 
 are 
 
 why as 
 
 
Figure 4.3 : Access the “Property” option of a synthesize process
Figure 4.4 : Setting “Keep Hierarchy” parameter to “YES” value
  
24 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2 The Arbiter  
For an arbiter we use pozitive edge triggerred D type Flip Flop. 
clock input of flip flop to an internal system clock signal done by synthesize
us to implement own D type flip flop. The
the figure 3.10 [15] 
 
Figure 
The operation of D Flip-
comes earlier than that of 
differnece between two signals is less than the setup time of the 
remains at ‘0’ instead of being switched to 
factor or imbalance in ratio of numbers 
probability of comming ‘1’ or ‘0’ at the 
Frequently most of flip flops favor the path to output ‘0’. 
skews we fix some of the most significant challe
path connected to a gate input
switch blocks or challenge 
in response, has been determined experimenta
have been measured against randomly generated challenge vectors. 
PUF with n= 64 switch blocks 
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Unwilling wiring of 
 schematic of the Flip flop are sho
4.5 : The D type edge-triggered flip flop 
 flop are illustrated in the Figure 3.3. As the rising edge of D 
G, an ideal arbiter output must be 1. However, if
Flip-flop
‘1’. This property introduces an skew 
of 1 and 0 at the output. The desiring 
output must be the same and equal to 0,5. 
So, to compensate for the 
nge to effectively lengthen the delay 
 [2]. Also, in the graduation project [15] the number of 
bits, n, giving almost equal rate of logic ‘1’ and logic’0’
lly. In this experiment, the 
Implementing 
 
r make 
wn on 
 
 the time 
 , an output 
 
responses 
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almost solve our skew problem. In our experiments, with 64 switch blocks we obtain 
the rate 61 %. 
  The two signals emitted from the source at the same time after passing through 
switch blocks arrives to data and clock input of the arbiter. For implementation of the 
flip-flop shown in figure 4.10 we need a primitive NAND gates. That can be 
accomplished by configuration of LUT as result of synthesizing the next code: 
LUT2_inst : LUT2 
generic map ( 
INIT => X"7") 
port map (  O => O, 
I0 => I0, -- LUT input 
I1 => I1  -- LUT input 
); 
Figure 4.6 : The VHDL code synthesizing a NAND gate 
 
4.3  Placement of Switch Box 
In order to maximize the inter-chip variation, the delay path must be placed and 
routed as symmetrically as possible so as to minimize the delay differences between 
two paths[1]. Since Xilinx ISE places the gates automatically not considering the 
wire length or wire delay, the implemented PUF always gives response that biased to 
logic ‘1’ or logic ’0’. So symmetrical placement of switch box minimizing the wire 
delay shown on the figure 4.12 For that placement we should manually drag and 
place the MUXs in the according slices that contains this logic gates in Xilinx 
Floorplanner tool. Having done this placement the tool automatically  write this 
constraint into “ucf” file,which is designated for defining pozition, time, connection 
constraints. In this file must be inserted the constraints that fix upper and lower 
MUXs. In order to keep them close one of them are placed in F LUT the other in G 
LUT in the according slices. For that we must enter the following codes in “ucf” file 
shown on the figure 4.13: 
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Figure 4.7 : The placement of MUX switches in Floorplanner 
 
Figure 4.8 : Constraints in “UCF” file to select LUT F and LUT G for 
placement of MUXs 
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5. ANALYSIS AND CHARACTERIZATION OF ARBITER-BASED PUF 
In this section we present the primary characteristics of arbiter-based PUF such as 
inter-chip variation, measurement noise, and environmental variations, which have 
important effects on identification process between different PUFs. 
5.1 Inter-chip Variation  
5.1.1 Information –bearing challenges 
Information –bearing challenges can be defined as the challenges whose responses in 
a number of different PUFs are not equal. In order to identify a large amount of  PUF 
on FPGA we need considerable numbers of information-bearing challenges. In an 
experiment where we applied 2000 randomly chosen challenges to 37 chips we could 
define the ratio of information bearing challenges. Due to the lack of so many 
FPGAs in our laboratory I decided to make experiments on available two FPGA 
chips but with different positions of PUF circuit across the FPGA chip wafers.  The 
results of measurements done in another graduation project [2] approve our decision. 
The results obtained there shows that the variations across different wafers is similar 
to the variations across one wafer.  
Putting the obtained data in matrix form enable us to facilitate some manipulations 
over data. The entries Ri,j  in this matrix are the PUF function F(j) (corresponding to j 
FPGA chip)   which takes C(i) as an input vector.  
For each challenges, we have calculated the probability of a response being 1 as 
follows, in other words we count the occurence of 1 across a row and divide it by the 
number of tested FPGA chips or j.  
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Table 5.1 : Table of responses for different PUF circuits against challenges 
 Response of each PUF, F(j) 
Challenges, 
C(i)  
F(1) F(2) F(3) ... F(h) 
C(1) R1,1 R1,2 R1,3 R1,... R1,h 
C(2) R2,1 R2,2 R2,3 R2,... R2,h 
... Ri,1 Ri,2 Ri,3 Ri,j Ri,h 
C(v) Rv,1 Rv,2 Rv,3 Rv,j Rv,h 
 
	)  _`),a9)  1  +:b       (5.1)      
where k is the number of PUFs that output 1 against each challenge vector 9), 
V  c1,2, … , Nd and e  c1,2, … , fd. Figure 5.1 shows the density function of the 
random variable pi for 2000 challenges. When 	)=0 or 	)=1 , the challenge does not 
generate any information since all PUF response are equal. Except for the cases 
when 	)=0, 	)=1 , more than 84 % of the total challenges are information-bearing 
challenges.  
 
Figure 5.1 : The density function of the random variable pi=Pr(Ri,j(Ci)=1) 
The changes in responses of PUFs across a row in the table [2]are resulted from 
differences in a process variation.  The changes in responses of PUFs across a 
column are arised from different challengesDefinition and evaluation of inter-chip 
variation  
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Here we define the inter-chip variation between two different PUFs as below. For 
two different PUF responses `),g(9)) and `),U(9)) to a challenge 9) we can define a 
function  that compare the responses  which are the inputs to this function . This 
function behaves like XOR logic function. 
Dm, p = XOR(`),g(9)), Ri, p(9)))=`),g9) K`),U9) (5.2) 
where m  c1,2 …  %d , p  c1,2 …  %d, i  c1,2 …  Nd 
Simply by this formula we estimate the Hammming distance between responses of 
two different FPGAs. 
Inter-chip variation is one of the basic functions tha make the PUF ouputs unique. It 
is very important for security of PUF based identification. If the PUF produces 
uniformly distributed independent random bits, the inter-chip variation should be 50 
% on average [2].  
For a random challenge set C, we define the inter-chip variation yi,j  between PUF i 
and j  as 
g,U  :|iM| ∑ -g,U9) (5.3)        
For convenience, we denote the inter-chip variation by (100 * ),a) 
Let ‘s assume that our responses from different FPGAs are in matrix or table form as 
it’s shown in the table 1.  Finding inter-chip variations between PUFi snd PUFj  is 
equvalent to finding  the hamming distance between two columns that corresponds to 
FPGA with i index and  FPGA with j index. 
We have evaluated yi,j  from 91 arbiter-based PUF pairs using a random challenge set 
C, where |C|=20000. Figure 5.2 shows the density function of 91 evaluated inter-chip 
variation. Our test-chips have 34% inter-chip variation on average, and the minimum 
inter-chip variation is 2%. So minimum value of inter-chip is not allowable since it is 
less than our environmental noise, which will be described in the next section. It 
means that we can not distinguish any of two different FPGA using these challenges. 
This PUF based system is vulnerable to impersonation attacks.    
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Figure 5.2 : The density of the inter-chip variation yi,j for a number of  
PUF pairs. 
5.2 Environmental Variations 
Environmental or intra-chip variation is the property that make outputs of a PUF 
reproducibile. It is important for reliability in applications based on PUFs. We desire 
0 % intra-chip variation [15].  
Noise, which may cause unreliability in measured PUF responses are arised from 
temperature and power supply variation [9]. 
Temperature or power supply voltage variations can significantly change circuits 
delay and lead to unreliable responses. Since we exploit relative delay measurement, 
arbiter-based PUFs are robust to such environmental variations. Figure 5.3 shows the 
amount of environmental variation introduced by temperature (µt) and voltage 
variation (µv) . The reference responses are measured at 27 °C and 1,8 V power 
supply voltage [2]. In this experiments 10000 challenges are used to estimate 
environmental variations. Even if the temperature increases more than 40 degrees to 
70 °C , µt , 4,82 %[2]. Also with ± 2% power supply voltage variation , µv , 3,74% 
.Both µt and µv are below the average inter-chip variation. 
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Figure 5.3 : The variation of PUF responses due to temperature and power 
supply changes[2] 
5.3 Identification/Authentication Abilites 
When we use PUFs for the identification of registered users, there exists  the server 
that stores CRP profile of N registrered PUFs in the database. Each CRP profiles has 
k CRPs. When a user  present a PUF to the server, the server generates CRPs using 
the presented PUF  and compare it with all CRP profiles of the registered users in the 
database. The server identifies the user by finding the minimum distance CRP profile 
from generated CRPs of the presented PUF. 
In this identification scheme we are trying to find the number k that enable us to 
identify N=109 different chips with the negligible error probability. It’s apparent that 
before finding the sufficient challenge number k we need to calculate the number of 
information bits or delay stages of PUF to distinguish between 1 billion components.  
The birthday phenomenon will guide us to the right answer. It ‘s so named because 
the problem of finding two random challenges which gives the same response value 
is identical to finding two people in a group of people who share the same birthday 
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with probability greater than a certain threshold.  The probability of one collision is 
expressed in the next inequality [17] 
P>1Ajk[[kXZl   
where n - the number of evaluation, m-possible outputs (m=2l , l –is the number of 
information bits)  
If we require that the probability of a collision be greater than 0.5, all we have to do 
is to find that value n in terms of m which makes it happen. We found that n 
approximately equal to =: *m  . This solution say that in the set of m possible outputs 
after n times evaluation the ouput will repeat with the probability more than 0,5. 
Therefore n is the maximum number of times when we can get different output. 
Similarly in our problem of finding l information bits to distinguish 1 billion 
components we need m (the number of all possible challenges)   which is equal to n2 
. So the number of all possible challenges  is 1018 which is aproximately equal to 260 . 
Thus to distinguish 109 chips we need more than 60 information bits.  
In the master  thesis[1] identification/authentication  capability of arbiter-based PUFs 
based on inter-chip variation ζ and noise probability µ have been  studied. Using 
ζ=0.22 and  µ=0.048  the number of sufficient challenges k is calculated as 443 with 
error probability pe  <
:
n=10-9 . The conclusion that using less than 450 CRPs we can 
authenticate 1 billions of PUF with negligible probability[2]. 
To imagine how many combinations can be created with the responses to  450 
challenges where the ratio of 1’s in 450 bit output vector  is 50 %  we solve the 
combination problem where we try to place 225 numbers of 1 in 450 cells. Our 
expected expression will be  
oB  450! 225! 225! 
The maximum number of components oB that can be distinguished by 450 
challenges is approximately equal to 10134 . In this expression we don’t consider 
inter-chip variations and environmental variations.  Including these factors 
significantly lower this value.  
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Using the inter- chip factors and measurement noise will make changes to our 
identification scheme[16].Suppose that a PUF wants to authenticate itself as Alice. 
Then she server asks the PUF to generate a list of CRPs corresponding to CRP 
profile of Alice in server’s database. If the PUF is indeed Alice, then each generated 
response bit differs from the corresponding profile’s response bit with probability µ . 
If the PUF is not who it claims to be, then this probability is equal to the inter-chip 
variation ζ(>µ) .  
Inter-chip and intra-chip variation(environmental noise) give us new definitions in 
identification and authentication process which are false pozitive and false negative. 
False positive is probability that PUF A  will be authenticated as PUF B when PUF 
A produce the same output as PUF B. False negative is probability that a correct PUF 
will fail to be authenticated when PUF fail to regenerate a consistent output [15]. 
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6. SOFTWARE ATTACKS ON ARBITER-BASED PHYSICAL 
UNCLONABLE FUNCTION  
A software attack is one of the non-invasive attacks. It can be realized using the 
lineer programming technique or using machine learning algorithm. In the first case 
an adversary can formulate the response of a PUF as a function of challenges and 
delay parameters. If the challenge-response model of the PUF circuit is linear, then 
an adversary can apply a polynomial number of random challenges and monitor the 
response to estimate circuit delay parameters in linear model. If the model can 
predict the response of the circuit with error probability lower than the maximum 
environmental variation, the adversary can impersonate the original PUF with model. 
So the main goal of an adversary must be to find out all delay parameters because in 
this case he could calculate response for any input challenges.   
Using Simplex method and Matlab program in lineer programming problem we tried 
to simulate attacks of an adversary. In this attack, Matlab produces random 
challenges and calculate the responses against each 64 bit challenge. In attack using 
linear programming approach a certian number of challenge-response pairs or 
inequalities are used. Simplex algorithm helps us to solve for delay parameters. To 
analyze the success of this attack we increase the number of input CRPs step by step. 
The result of attacks using CRPs collected from PUF on FPGA show us the 
consistency between CRPs created by lineer model in Matlab and measured from 
PUF on FPGA.   
The second attack using support vector machine (SVM) classifier, which is one of   
the machine learning algorithm, show us the possibility to predict the response of 
challenges in a test set after training the classifier with CRPs in training set. In neural 
network the feature vectors with 1 and 0 labels are separated by threshold plane.  
In the last part of the chapter we mention about causes of failure in linear modeling. 
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6.1 Prediction Tools 
In order to make attacks or to find out the all delay parameters of the system having 
only limited number of CRPs we need calculation tools. Having found all parameters 
we will able to estimate the response of PUF against each challenge in CRP list of 
database. This problem can be solved using classification and optimization methods.  
We will talk about Simplex algorithm which can be categorized as one of the widely 
used optimization tools for linear programming model.  
The other prediction tool that we will use is based on a machine learning algorithm 
for classification problem. The classification normally refers to a  a procedure that 
learns to classify new instances based on learning from a training set of instances that 
have been properly labeled by hand with the correct classes. An algorithm that 
implements classification, especially in a concrete implementation, is known as a 
classifier. One of the most widely used classifiers is support vector machine (SVMs) 
classifier [17].  
6.1.1 Lineer Programming technique 
A Linear Programming problem is a special case of a Mathematical Programming 
problem. More formally, linear programming is a technique for the optimization of a 
linear objective function, subject to linear equality and linear inequality constraints. 
Linear programs are problems that can be expressed in canonical form [18]: 
Maximize   f Tx   
 object to Ax w b  
where y represents the vector of variables (to be determined),  and z are vectors of 
(known) coefficients and  is a (known) matrix of coefficients. The expression to be 
maximized or minimized is called the objective function ({y in this case). The 
equations y w  z are the constraints which specify a convex polytope over which 
the objective function is to be optimized. Linear programming can be applied to 
various fields of study. It is used most extensively in business and economics, but 
can also be utilized for some engineering problems.  
Let’s consider a simple example of linear programming (LP) problem [19]: 
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Find numbers x1  and x2 that maximize the sum x1 + x2 subject to the constraints 
x1|0 , x2| 0 and  
} : 5 2* w 44: 5 2* w 12A1: 5 1* w 1~ (6.1)           
 
 
In this problem there are two unknowns, and five constraints. The first two 
constraints x1|0 , x2| 0 , are special . These are called nonnegativity constraints and 
are often found in linear programming problems. The other constraints are then 
called the main constraints. The function to be maximized (or minimized) is called 
the objective function. Here, the objective function is x1 + x2. We can solve this 
problem by graphing the set of point in the plain that satisfies all the constraints and 
then finding which point of this set maximizes the value of the objective function. 
Each inequality constraint is satisfied by a half-plane of points, and the constraint set 
is the intersection of all the half-planes. In the present example, the constraint set is 
the five-sided figure shaded in Figure 6.1  
 
Figure 6.1 : Example of solving linear programming problem 
We seek the point :, *, that achieves the maximum of x1 + x2 as :, * ranges 
over this constrain set. Therefore, we seek the line of slope -1 that is farthest from the 
origin and still touches the constraint set. This occurs at the intersection of the lines 
4: 5 2*  12 and : 5 2*  4, namely (x1 , x2 )=(8/3,2/3) . It is easy to see in 
general that the objective function, being linear, always takes its maximum (or 
minimum) value at a corner point of the constraint set, provided the constraint set is 
bounded. 
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The simplex algorithm, developed by George Dantzig in 1947, solves LP problems 
by constructing a feasible solution at a corner of the polytope and then walking along 
a path on the edges of the polytope to corners with non-decreasing values of the 
objective function until an optimum is reached[19]. 
 For solving LP problems in MATLAB we need Optimization Toolbox including 
LINPROG routine[20].  
6.1.2 Lineer Support Vector Machine 
Given a set of training examples, each marked as belonging to one of two categories, 
an SVM training algorithm builds a model that predicts whether a new example falls 
into one category or the other. 
Classification is achieved by a linear or nonlinear separating surface in the input 
space of the dataset. When the feature vectors of the training set are linearly 
separable by a hyperplane, we can build a linear SVM that uses the structural risk 
minimization principle to decrease classification errors.  
Here we gives a description of linear SVM. Let’s suppose that we are given training 
data D, a set of n points of the form [21] 
-  B)), )B)  `U, )  cA1,1dd)?:(  (6.2)                
where the ) is either 1 or −1, indicating the class to which the point B) belongs. 
Each B)  is a p-dimensional real vector. We want to find the maximum-margin 
hyperplane that divides the points having ) = 1 from those having ) = − 1. Any 
hyperplane can be written as the set of points B satisfying 
 · B 5 F  0 (6.3)                     
where · denotes the dot product. The vector  is a normal vector. It’s perpendicular 
to the hyper plane.  
We want to choose  the w and b to maximize the margin, or distance between the 
parallel hyperplanes that as far apart as possible while still separating data. The 
hyperplanes can be divided by two equations 
′ · B 5 F  1 (6.4)                     
′ · B 5 F  A1 (6.5)                     
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We find the distance between these two hyper planes is |||| . So we want to 
minimize ||w|| .  In some cases, the dataset can not be classified clearly because of 
non-linearity at the boundary of each class. Considering this case, our goal is not 
only to make the distance, as large as possible, but also minimize the number of 
misclassifications. 
 
Figure 6.2 : Maximum- margin hyperplane separating classes 
This is equivalent to minimizing the cost function[2]  
, F, 
3   :*  ||||* 5  
3 (6.6)      
where 
3 is the number of mis-classifications. The parameter  is the positive 
constant reducing of which  allows more data to lie on the wrong side of hyper plane 
and would be treated as outliers which give smoother decision boundary[6]. 
Lagrangian Support Vector Machines(LSVM) provide fast converging algorithm to 
the minimal point of the cost function [2]. 
 
 
6.1.3 Radial Base Functions Support Vector Machine 
There may be another situation where the points are clustered such that the two 
classes are not linearly separable as shown in the Figure 6.7. In such cases, one 
prefers non-linear mapping of data into some higher dimensional space called 
‘feature space’, where it is linearly separable. The original space of data points is 
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called ‘input space’. The hyperplane in ‘feature space’ corresponds to a highly non-
linear separating surface in the original input space, in the Figure 6.9 [27]. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 : Mapping process for a nonlinear separating surface 
Given a training D set of 
 data point, -  B)), )B)  `U, )  cA1,1dd)?:(  
the support vector method approach aims at constructing a classifier of the form [28]: 
B  Vf
^∑ )()?: )B, B) 5 7] (6.7) 
Where ) are positive real constant and 7 is a real constant.  B, B) is a row of 
radial basis function and for RBF SVM can be expressed as B, B) 
exp cAB A  B)*/*d. . , .  is also called kernel function and || . || represents a 
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norm that is generally Euclidean. The known data points  B)  `U i=1,2…n are the 
center of radial basis functions. Radial functions are a special class of function. Their 
characteristic feature is that their response decreases (or increases) monotonically 
with distance from a central point. The centre, the distance scale, and the precise 
shape of the radial function are parameters of the model. 
6.2 Attacks on PUF Circuit Using Linear Programming Aproach  
6.2.1 Experiments with the lineer model of PUF circuit 
In this experiment, using definite numbers of known CRPs and the lineer model of 
PUF circuit Lineer Programming technique is trying to find the delay variables. After 
estimation of these delay varaibles it is easily to obtain new responses  for any new 
challenges. The Lineer Programming technique is implemented by the function 
linprog (f,A,b), which is included in optimization tool of the Matlab. Let’s formulate 
the lineer programming problem one more time: 
=V
  0  such that}     w 77 w  w T7 ~ (6.8) 
In our case we need to find x (delay variables), which must satisfies the constraint 
inequality  w 7 , where b is zero vector and A is matrix with row elements, 
expressed in the inequality (3.25). Furthermore, 7 and T7 specify the lower and the 
upper bound for the delay variable correspondingly. We take each element of the 
vector f equal to 0, since the objective function is not specified in our case. As a 
result, optimization problem is turned into constraint solving problem. 
Our test are performed for a PUF circuit with n, number of stages equal to 64. We 
describe the test procedure step by step below: 
•  The first step: Matlab produce 50000 random challenge vectors with 64 bit 
length using unifrom distribution function, rand(1). At the same time, Matlab 
generate random 65 delay variables . After application of the challenges and 
random delay variables to the lineer model of the PUF we obtain the 
responses. These responses are saved in a file with according challenges. In 
this file all CRPs are divided into 2 equal parts which are called train set and 
test set. 
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• The second step: We read o. CRPs from the train set and transform the 
challenges  to the elements of matrix A which is used in the   7 
expression of the Lineer Programming problem. 
• The third step: We use these o. rows to solve for  
 5  1 variables. For this 
purpose the Simplex algorithm are applied. 
• The fourth step: We generate 25000 numbers of response using challenges in 
the test set and the estimated delay variables. Then we compare the responses 
produced by our model with estimated variables and the responses from the 
test set. The percentage of errors are given in the Figure 6.4 : 
 
 
Figure 6.4 : The graph of error rates in prediction of responses by Lineer  
Programming technique for the lineer model of the PUF 
In order to identify a chip error rates in prediction of the responses must be less than 
the environmental noise, which has maximum value 4.82 %. This test shows that to 
break the PUF scheme we need only 512 CRPs 
6.2.2 Experiments with the PUF on the FPGA 
For the next experiment, CRPs measured from the PUF on the FPGA are used. The 
applied procedure are given below: 
• First step: We produce 50000 random challenge vectors with 64 bits length 
using uniform distribution function, rand(1). After application of these 
challenges to the PUF,the measured responses are saved in a file with applied 
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challenges. In this file all CRPs are divided into 2 equal parts which are 
called train set and test set. 
• Second step: We read o. CRPs from the train set and transform the 
challenges  to the elements of matrix A which is used in the   7 
expression of the  Lineer Programming problem. 
• Third step: We used these o. CRPs to solve for  
 5  1 variables. For this 
purpose we use the Simplex algorithm supported by Matlab. 
• Fourth step: We generate 25000 numbers of responses using challenges in the 
test set and estimated delay variables. Then we compare the responses 
produced by our model with estimated delays and the responses produced by 
the PUF on the FPGA. 
. The percentage of prediction errors are given in the Figure 6.5 . 
 
 
Figure 6.5 : The graph of error rates in prediction of responses by Lineer 
Programming technique for a PUF on the FPGA  
The results in the Figure 6.5 show that the relation between input vectors and output 
bits of the implemented PUF doesn’t follow the derived lineer model, formulated in 
the inequality 3.23 
We will talk about the reason of failure in prediction of responses in the last section 
of this chapter. 
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6.3 Attacks on PUF Circuit Using Support Vector Machine Classifiers 
6.3.1 Experiment with the lineer model of the PUF circuit  
We performed the test on CRPs generated according to the linear model of the PUF 
circuit. Our PUF is 64 bits in length . We apply the same test procedure as it has been 
done in section 6.2.1 . The one difference is that in the third step instead of linear 
programming technique we are using SVM classifiers. These classifiers are called 
lineer SVM and radial basis function (RBF) SVM because of the lineer and RBF 
kernel functions. As a software tool I have used  LIBSVM (Library for Support 
Vector Machines)tool, which is developed by Chang and Lin[24]. The percentage of 
prediction error is given in the Figure 6.6 and in the Figure 6.7. These figures show 
that Lineer SVM classifier are more successful than RBF SVM in classification of 
CRPs generated by the lineer model of the PUF.Indeed , in the classification 
problem, which is implemented by Lineer SVM classifier, only definite number of 
CRPs between 512 and 1024 are enough to break the authentication scheme based on 
a PUF.However, for RBF SVM classifier we need the number CRPs between 1024 
and 2048. 
 
Figure 6.6 : The graph of error rates in prediction of responses by Lineer SVM for 
the lineer model of the PUF  
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Figure 6.7 : The graph of error rates in prediction of responses by RBF SVM  
for the lineer model of the PUF 
6.3.2 Experiments with the PUF on the FPGA 
In order to investigate the success of SVM classifiers in the prediction of responses 
of the PUF on the FPGA and to compare it with the results for the lineer model of the 
PUF circuit we made an experiment. In this experiment the SVM classifiers are 
trying to predict the responses for challenges in the test set as it is described in the 
test procedure given in the section 6.2.2. Instead of linear programming tool we use 
lineer SVM and RBF SVM classifiers. The percentage of prediction errors are given 
in the Figure 6.8 and in the Figure 6.9. We can see significant differences in 
prediction errors, given in the Figure 6.6 and in the Figure 6.8. The same is true for  
the results given in the Figure 6.7 and in the Figure 6.9 or in the Figure 6.4 and in the 
Figure 6.5. The differences between the results of prediction for the lineer model of 
the PUF circuit and the PUF on the FPGA shows inconsistency between the data. 
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Figure 6.8 : The graph of error rates in prediction of responses by Lineer SVM  
classifier for the PUF on the FPGA  
 
 
Figure 6.9 : The graph of error rates in prediction of responses by RBF SVM  
classifier for the PUF on the FPGA 
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In this case RBF SVM classifier are more successful than Lineer SVM in the 
experiments with the PUF on the FPGA. However, in this attack we could not reduce 
the error rate under environmental noise rate as it is supposed to be in order to 
succeed. However, this result verify that PUF can be more vulnerable to more 
sophisticated software that may be already exist or will be developed in near future. 
Variable resistance to different software attacks is undesirable from the security 
aspect. 
6.4 The Reason of Differences in Responses between the Lineer Model of the 
PUF and the PUF on the FPGA 
High error rate in classification problem using SVM classifiers and linear 
programming approach applied to the data measured from implemented PUF on the 
FPGA show inconsistency between responses of linear model and responses from the 
PUF on the FPGA. The result of analysis, made below, approves that we could not 
satisfy the main condition of symmetry in implementation of the PUF circuit on the 
FPGA.  
 
Figure 6.10 : The last stage of thePUF circuit with the cell and  
the connect delays 
To identify the critical path in a design and to check whether the timing constraints 
could be fulfilled, timing analysis tools are used. This tool uses the difference 
between required time and actual path delays. Actual path delays which consist of 
the delay of the design elements and interconnects are read from SDF ( Standard 
Delay Format) file. If we use approach of statistical static timing analysis all the 
delays can be described in terms of mean and standart deviations as it is shown on 
50 
 
the Figure 6.9[25] . Worst case operating condition corresponds to the extreme 3σ 
corners in the Figure 6.11. So, in the statistical timing model any delay can be 
separated as a static delay component and a random delay component. Random delay 
component are caused by process variation which can reach 3,5 % of nominal (mean) 
value [26] and refer to 3σ corner in statistical delay model.  
For investigation of effect of static delay and random delays on the response of PUF 
we can use the figure (6.8). Proceeding from previous knowledge let us write 
expressions for delays at point 1 and point 2 as it is done in the expression (6.7) and 
(6.8). The result of PUF circuit will depend on the difference ∆8 ,which is expressed 
in (6.9)  
8:  8:,. 5 8:,W   (6.9)  
8*  8*,. 5 8*,W   (6.10)  
|∆8|  |8: A 8*|  |∆8. 5 ∆8W| (6.11)          
 
Figure 6.11 : Statistical model of delay capturing process variations 
between ICs 
From the Figure 6.10 we can derive expressions for  8:,., 8*,., 8:,W , 8*,W is a function 
of 8::(:, 8*:(:, 8::(: and 8g:,(   
8:,.  9(8::(:+ 9(8*:(: + 8::(: 5  8g:,(    (6.12)     
8*,.  9(8**(:+ 9(8:*(: + 8::(: 5  8g*,(  (6.13)     
8:,W  8g:,W(  (6.14)         
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8*,W  8g*,W(  (6.15) 
In the figure (6.12) the result of assymetry in wiring cause a big differences between 
static delays of path 1 and path 2 before the arbiter.. By using these equations and 
static or mean delay form timing analysis we can find cumulative delay at point 1 
and 2 . The result are graphycally displayed in the figure (6.13) and (6.14). From the 
figure (6.13) we find the ratio of static component to random component as 
 8  8Wm , 50 and from the figure(6.14)  8  8Wm , 0.4. As it is seen from the 
figure (6.14), in direct connection of switch block the response of PUF are not 
determined by ∆8W but ∆8 since ∆8 value are considerably more than ∆8W. 
In the figure (6.13), the value of ∆8 is less than ∆8W which means that our response 
are completely depends on random process variation.      
 
Figure 6.12 : Static delays for last stage of PUF circuit 
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Figure 6.13 : Cumulative delay for last stage of PUF with cross connected 
switch block  
 
 
 
Figure 6.14 : Cumulative delay for last stage of PUF with direct connected 
switch block 
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7. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis we have investigated the security and reliability for arbiter-based PUF 
circuit and conducted preliminary experiments. By using authentication method 
based on PUF circuit it is possible to store secrets on a chip that is less vulnerable to 
invasive attacks than traditional digital methods.   
We have implemented arbiter-based PUF using MUX on Xilinx Virtex 2 Pro FPGA. 
Experiment results have shown that there are enough variation between 
programmable gates not only on different FPGA chip but also on the same chip for 
identification purposes. The undesired effect of temperature and power supply 
voltage variations can change the delay characteristic of PUF circuit making worse 
the reliability parameter. Experiments of applying different challenges to PUFs 
circuit which are in different position across FPGA chip show that not any challenge 
can be used for identification purposes. Some of the challenges produce the same 
outputs in different FPGA circuits. The assymetry in wiring reduce the numbers of 
challenges that provide high inter-chip variations. 
We have tested the security of linear model PUF circuit, described by equation in 
section 3.5, against software attacks. For this purpose we have used the linear model 
the security analysis of linear model created in Matlab suggest that the device could 
be vulnerable to model building software attack. In fact, we see that  
Our experiments where we use the responses produced by linear model and response 
measured from implemented PUF have shown different resistance to software 
attacks. In linear model, 1024 CRPs is enough to solve for all delay variable or to 
predict the outputs for any next challenges. Hovewer, lineer programming and lineer 
SVM haven’t succeeded in prediction of responses, which bring the fact of 
inconsistency between reponses of the lineer model and the responses measured from 
FPGA. Delay analysis report presented by Xilinx Timing Analyzer tool have shown 
that in spite of symmetrical position arrangement of MUXs across a chip we could 
not achieve desired symmetry in wire delays between switch blocks. It lead to 
corruption of responses in the PUF on the FPGA.  In spite of that, application of 
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SVM using radial based kernel have considerably increased prediction rate up to 90 
percent where we need 17600 CRPs for a training procedure. This fact verify that 
PUF based system can be vulnerable to more sophisticated attacks, which is 
unacceptable from the security aspect. Especially in case of man in the middle attack. 
Since authentication process of PUF occures in untrusted and open environment the 
adversary can easily collect the data, which will be used for software attacks. More 
authentication process provides him more CRPs. The low intra-chip variation can 
complicate the aim of adversary since in this case we need more CRPs to train our 
machine learning algorithm. 
In order to prevent the predictions of responses, we can employ non-linear arbiters 
such as feed-forward arbiter PUFs. It is difficut for an adversary to build an 
appropriate software model of these arbiters [1].  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A.1: Extraction of Expressions for ui and vi Variables in the 
Equation 3.17 
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Figure A. 1 : Two successive MUX blocks with delay variables 
Let’s try to express T)variable defined in section (3.5) in terms wire delays -::) ,  -:*)  , 
 -*:) ,  -**) and upper MUX and lower MUX gate delays which are  -g:) ,  and  -g*) , 
respectively. We can achieve it by simple substitution  of &) , 8) , 7),  )   parameters  in terms 
of wire and gate delays which are shown in Figure A.1 . 
&)   -::) 5   -g:)  (A.1)        
7)    -:*) 5  -g*)  (A.2)        
   -**) 5   -g*)  (A.3)        
8)   -*:) 5   -g:)  (A.4)        
   Pz   XX
M P  lXM  ZXM   lXM  P   XZM P lZM  ZZM   lZM     
 XXM  ZZM P XZM   ZXM     (A.5)       
)  5 Az5 = XX
M P  lXM P ZXM P  lXM    XZM P lZM P ZZM P  lZM  
 XXM  ZZM P ZXM  XZM  5  -g:) A  -g*) ) (A.6) 
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